In Memoriam
Nineteen American servicemen died during Operation Urgent Fury. Thanks to those of you who have supplied names of the fallen. Please let us know if there are any corrections that need to be made.

Army
SGT Randy E. Cline
SSG Gary L. Epps
SP4 Philip S. Grenier
SGT Kevin J. Lannon (posthumous promotion)
CPT Keith Lucas
SGT Sean P. Luketina
PFC Marlin R. Maynard
SGT Mark A. Rademacher
CPT Michael F. Ritz
PFC Russell L. Robinson
SGT Stephen E. Slater
SP4 Mark O. Yamane

Navy
MM1 Kenneth Gary Butcher
MM1 Kevin P. Lundberg
HP1 Stephen L. Morris
ENCS Robert R. Schamberger

Marine Corps
Maj John P. Gigure
1stLt Jeffrey R. Scharver
Capt Jeb Seagle

Operation Urgent Fury
The Rangers had little time to prepare for their role in Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada. Within hours of receiving orders to move, Ranger units were marshaling at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia, prepared to board C-130s and MC-130s for the ride to Grenada. Their first objective was Point Salines airfield, located on the island's most southwestern point. While securing the airfield, Rangers were to secure the True Blue Campus at Salines, where American medical students were in residence. As quickly as possible, Ranger units were then to take the army camp at Calivigny.

Things started to go wrong as the operation began. A Navy SEAL team was unable to get ashore; they were to have provided intelligence on the airfield at Salines. H-hour, originally scheduled during darkness, was moved several times until morning twilight. In the lead MC-130s there were problems with the inertial navigation equipment. Since there were no hatch mount antennas on the cargo doors of the aircraft, communications to Ranger units were delayed while passing through Air Force communications. While in the air, the Rangers were notified of photographic intelligence indicating obstructions on the field. Instead of landing, the majority of transport would have to drop all the Rangers at Salines so the runway could be cleared.

In some aircraft the men were told to remove their harness, rucksack, and main and reserve parachutes. These items were placed in kit bags and moved forward to facilitate off-loading troops and cargo. Before long, the loadmasters were yelling, "Only thirty minutes fuel left. Rangers are fighting. Jump in Twenty minutes." These Rangers now had to re-rig for the drop, unpacking nonessential equipment and pulling on parachutes. Rucksacks had to be hooked under the reserve pack and weapons strapped to the left side. Under these conditions it was not possible for the jumpmaster to check each man, so buddy rigging was employed.

Aboard the lead MC-130, navigation equipment failed and the pilot reported he could not guarantee finding the landing zone. Rain squalls made it impossible to employ a lead change, so both lead aircraft pulled away to the south. As the Rangers approached the target, the aircraft were out of assigned order and the planned order of arrival was no longer possible. This meant that the runway clearing team would not be the first on the field. The Rangers then requested a mass parachute assault, a contingency previously planned, so that only the order of exit from the aircraft would be affected, but the Air Force would not conduct a mass drop.

On October 25, 1983, at 0534 the first Rangers began dropping at Salines: a platoon of B 1/75 and the Battalion Tactical Operations Center (TOC), followed almost 25 minutes later by part of A 1/75. Over a half hour later the rest of A 1/75, minus seven men were over Salines. It was now 0634, but the emaining men of 1/75 would not be on the ground until 07:05.

Men of 1/75 assembled on the east end of the runway. They were short C 1/75, which had been sent with sixty Special Operations Forces troops to take the Richmond Hill prison. The Ranger battalions were already operating below strength. One reason for this seems to have been the fact that a limited number of aircraft and aircrews were trained for night operations. Over one and a half hours elapsed from the first drop of 1/75 until the last unit was on the ground shortly after seven in the morning. These men jumped from 500 feet so they would be in the air between 12 and 15 seconds. Their drop zone was very narrow because there was water on the north and south sides only a few meters from the runway.

At 07:07 the 2nd Battalion began to drop. For several hours their aircraft had orbited, waiting to unload and refuel. They dropped in a much shorter period, and all but one man was safely on the ground. One Ranger broke his leg, and one Ranger's static line became tangled as he exited the aircraft, dragging him against the tail of the plane before he was hauled back aboard. 2/75 assembled on the western end of the runway. Once on the ground, 1/75 was not under effective fire, and thus could begin to clear the runway of blocking trucks and bulldozers. Some of the vehicles had keys in them; others were hot-wired and removed. A Cuban bulldozer was used to flatten the stakes that had been driven into the ground with wires between them, and to push aside the drums placed on the runway. For fifteen minutes there was no enemy fire, and the Rangers worked without interruption.

By 10:00, 1/75 had its second platoon at the True Blue Campus and its first and third platoons had moved north of the runway. In the center, B1/75, had moved north and was holding the high ground not far from the Cuban headquarters. Units of 2/75 had cleared the area west of the airfield as well as the area north of their drop zone to Canoe Bay. The airfield was secure, and the C-130s, which had gone to Barbados to refuel, returned to unload equipment not dropped - which included jeeps, motorcycles, and Hughes 500 Defender helicopters.

Eight hours after landing, the commander of B 2/75, was notified that two Rangers were missing near their positions. The company commander decide the missing men must be near a building which lay between B Company and the Cuban positions. A Cuban construction worker was sent forward with an eleven-man Ranger squad under a flag of truce. While the Rangers remained outside, the Cuban entered and spoke with those inside, who agreed to a truce if the Rangers would treat the Cuban wounded. Two Rangers and seventeen wounded Cubans were evacuated. Afterward, the Ranger commander called for the Cubans to surrender, and 80 to 100 did so. The remainder surrendered later, after a brief fight, to the 82nd Airborne.

At 15:30 that afternoon, a counterattack was launched toward A 1/75, consisting of three BTR-60s, which moved through 2nd platoon's firing positions, firing toward the runway. The Rangers countered with rifles, M-60s, LAWs, and a recoilless rifle. Two of the BTRs hit each other when the first one halted. Both were disabled. The third began a hasty retreat and was hit in the rear. It was finally destroyed by an AC-130 Spectre gunship.

Eyewitness account: "The fight at the end of the runway on D-Day against the BTRs involved elements from both Bns. There was a cock-eyed plan to do some kind of two bn movement to contact east from the airfield that we were assembling for when the BTRs tried to break on to the runway (they couldn't have picked a worse time to attack us as 2/3s or more of our available Inf troops were within 500 meters of the action). It was a big gaggle; 1/75 elements already in blocking positions, parts of 2nd Bn assembling, and troops from the 82nd arriving and assembling to our rear (west). A/2/75 was the closest 2nd Bn unit to the action when it kicked off. The company commander, Frank Kearney, merely hustled a part of his company east through the True Blue Campus and went into a hasty blocking position on the right side of the road leading into the runway from the East. There were already several elements of 1/75 dug in on the left side of the road and to our front. 1/75 units already in blocking positions initiated engagement of the BTR force as it came into view. I ended up about 10 feet behind one of our 90 RR rifles and had a "50 yard line" seat for the show. One of the 90 shots from that weapon shredded the camo cover on my helmet. Both 1/75 and 2/75 RR gunners were deadly accurate. We paced off the distance from our gun, and it was about 380 meters, almost at max eff range (400 meters for the old 90 RR). Each of the BTRs sustained multiple 90 hits. The M 60 MG crews absolutely chewed up the accompanying Grenadian Inf. who were inside the BTRs. As they tried to pile out of the vehicles, the M-60s tattooed them. I recall one poor long legged guy get a leg hung up climbing out, and that was all she wrote."

The last action of the first day took place east of True Blue Campus, where Rangers came under fire from a house on top of a prominent hill, 1,000 meters east of the runway. No Spectre gunship was available, so an A-7 attack plane finally destroyed the house, but only after several duds landed alarmingly near the Rangers.

At the end of the first day in Grenada, the Rangers had secured the airfield and True Blue Campus at a cost of five dead and six wounded. Unfortunately, C 1/75, had run into a more difficult situation. When their Black Hawk helicopters arrived at the prison, the local defenses were active. Perched on a high ridge whose sides were almost vertical and covered by dense foliage, the prison was surrounded by walls twenty feet high and topped with barbed wire and watchtowers covering the area. Intelligence had failed to report the presence of two antiaircraft guns on a ridge some 150 feet higher then the prison, which brought the Black Hawks under fire. It was impossible to use ropes to lower the Rangers. The helicopters had to remain steady during this operation, making the Rangers and crews easy targets. No air support was possible at this time, since all small aircraft were engaged at Salines.

At least two attempts were made to bring the Black Hawks in to unload troops, but antiaircraft fire hit pilots, crew, and the attacking troops. Suppressive fire from the Black Hawks was ineffective because of their violent maneuvers Although some Rangers walked away from the crashed Black Hawks, others were badly hurt and were not immediately evacuated. Part of the evacuation problem seems to have been that Army pilots could not land aboard Navy ships because they were not qualified to do so, although this was eventually waived.

Intelligence failed at the prison and also when the Rangers were not informed until 1030 on the morning of the 25 October that there were still students at the second campus at Grand Anse. Students reported guards in the area, but the Rangers thought that they could bring the students out. A heliborne operation with Marine airlift from the Guam was planned. Marine helicopter squadron 261 was to provide the helicopters, with supporting fire from C-130 gunships, ships off the coast, and the Marines two remaining Cobra attack helicopters. American suppressive fire would continue until 20 seconds before the Rangers were committed.

The Rangers would fly to the objective in three waves, each composed of three CH-46s. Each wave of three would carry a company of Rangers, about 50 men. A 2/75 would go in first, followed by B 2/75, which was to cordon off the campus to prevent outside intervention. C 2/75 would then arrive, its mission to locate the students and pack them into four CH-53s waiting offshore. During lift-off the order of aircraft somehow became confused. Instead of the lead flight having three CH-46s carrying A 2/75, the first load had one from A Co. and two from B Co. Consequently, the second wave had two from A Co. and one from B Co. The first three aircraft missed the designated beach in front of the campus. There was sporadic small arms fire, but the only serious damage came from overhanging trees. One helicopter shut down and was abandoned in the surf, but the Rangers scrambled out as water poured in. Later a second machine was damaged by a tree.

The orbiting Sea Stallions were now brought in to remove the students. The Ch-46s returned and extracted the Rangers, completing the entire operation in 26 minutes. After leaving the beach, they realized that eleven men sent up as a flank guard had not returned. By radio these men were told to move toward positions held by the 82nd Airborne. the Rangers were not sure they could safely enter those lines, so they decided to use one of the inflatable boats from the disabled helicopter. However, the rafts had been damaged during the air assault. The Rangers soon had to swim alongside their damaged boat. having battled surf and tides for some time, they were spotted, picked up at 2300, and brought to the USS Caron lying off the coast.

One of the Rangers' initial D-day objectives, Calivigny barracks, had not been secured. Lying about 5 kilometers from the airfield, the barracks reportedly housed and trained troops. On 27 October, under the command of a Brigade Headquarters from the 82nd Airborne Division, a full scale attack was carried out by 2/75 and reinforced by C 1/75. Four waves of four Black Hawks, each carrying a company to assault the camp, were to fly out to sea before heading to the beach, flying low over the water at about 100 knots. Support was furnished by Spectre gunships and Navy A-7s. At Salines the Army had seventeen 105mm howitzers, and at sea the USS Caron would supply fire support. A 2/75 was to land at the southern end of the compound, on the left and right C 2/75 was to set down. B 2/75 was to land in the southeast, assault suspected antiaircraft guns, and rejoin the other companies in the north. In reserve was C 1/75, which would also hold the southern end of the perimeter.

The Black Hawks came in over the waves, climbing sharply to the top of the cliffs. Quickly the pilots slowed down in order to find the exact landing zone inside the perimeter. Each Black Hawk came in rapidly, one behind the other. The first helicopter put down safely, near the southern boundary of the camp, and was followed by the second. The third Black Hawk suffered some damage, and spun forward, smashing into the second machine. In the fourth Black Hawk, the crew saw what was happening and veered hard right; the aircraft landed in a ditch, damaging its tail rotor. Apparently not realizing that the helicopters rotor was damaged, the pilot attempted to move the Black Hawk, which rose sharply, seemed to spin forward, and crashed. In twenty seconds three machines were down. Debris and rotor blades flew through the air, badly wounding four Rangers and killing three who, sadly, were the only deaths in 2/75.

A 2/75 regrouped as C 2/75 landed on large concrete pads on the edge of the compound. B 2/75 also landed safely, and moved on its objective. C 1/75 also landed without incident. Contrary to expectations, the barracks were deserted. The Rangers found nothing. That night they slept in the rubble caused by the intense bombardment. this was their last action before returning to the United States.

Photographs and Reports of Grenada
Photographs from a Ranger's vacation to Grenada 15 years later, and letters and emails from Rangers and their families, can be found here.